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Abstract: 
This paper analyses the economic growth performance in the Arab world over the last 
forty years. The Arab world has managed to reduce poverty performance despite its relatively 
disappointing growth performance. We relate this poor performance of both oil and non-oil 
producers to investment. Contrary to widespread belief, we do not find evidence that low 
quantity of investment is the main of low growth. The decline in the investment rate followed 
rather than preceded the reduction in the aggregate growth rate. We conclude that the low 
quality of investment projects is the key determinant of growth. The excessive reliance on 
public investment, the low quality of financial institutions, the bad business environment (due 
to political and social instability and to excessive public intervention and overregulation) and 
the low quality of human capital are important determinants of systematically unproductive 
investment decisions and, thus, low economic growth.  
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 Growth 
The growth performance of the Arab World over the last twenty years is 
disappointing.  
Figure 1 displays a measure of “Arab World” GDP per capita between 1960 and 
2000.1 After increasing at rapid rates between 1963 and 1980, GDP per capita stagnated over 
the following two decades. In fact, GDP per capita in the region as a whole was lower in the 
year 2000 than in 1980. The huge decline of the early 1980s led to a very moderate recovery 
that has not yet helped the region to reach the income levels of 1980. Of course, not all 
economies within the Arab world behave exactly in the same way. For example, whereas the 
pattern of GDP per capita for oil-producing economies is similar to that of the group as a 
whole (the level is slightly higher for the oil countries than for the average country in the 
region, but the pattern over time is virtually identical), the non-oil producing countries grew 
almost continuously between 1960 and 2000 (see also Figure 1)2. The rate at which GDP per 
capita increased, however, also seemed to slow down after 1980.  
 
                                                           
1 The Arab World GDP per capita is constructed aggregating the World Banks or the 
Summers-Heston-Aten (2002) PPP-adjusted GDP data for each country and dividing it by 
aggregate population. Since the data are measured in PPP-adjusted units, it is strictly 
comparable across countries and, therefore, can be aggregated in principle. The countries 
used to construct this measure of Arab World GDP are: Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Comoros and Jordan. Lebanon, Libya, the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Iraq and Yemen have been excluded because of 
data limitations. For example, there is very little information available on the performance of 
the UAE economy. In fact, the Central Bank published price-adjusted real GDP figures for 
the first time in 2000. Iraq’s GDP data “disappeared” after the Gulf war.  
2  Oil producers are Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The rest of the Arab 
countries are non-oil producers. 
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The evolution of the growth rates for the Arab world and its decomposition between 
oil and non-oil producing countries is displayed in Figure 2. The first thing to notice is that 
the annual growth rate is highly volatile. The volatility is larger for the oil countries, which 
shows that the growth rate depends, at least in the short run, on oil prices.  
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The short-term volatility, however, masks some well defined medium and long-term 
trends. For example, if we add a linear trend line to Figure 2, we see that it is negatively-
sloped, which suggests that the growth rate has had a tendency to decline over time. The 
negative trend of the growth rate over time applies equally to the oil and non-oil producing 
countries. 
Figure 3 decomposes the annual growth rates into averages for five well-defined 
periods: the pre-oil-shock period (1963-1973), the oil-shock period (1974-1980), the period 
of steep decline in oil prices (1981-1985), the second half of the 1980s (1986-1990) and the 
1990s (1991-2000). We notice that the annual growth rate of per capita GDP for the Arab 
region as a whole between 1963 and 1973 was well above 4%. The growth rate declined 
slightly to just above 3% between 1974 and 1980. The growth rate was negative 2% between 
1980 and 1985, and it never recovered the levels of the 1960s: the rate was below 1% during 
the rest of the 1980s and the 1990s.  
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As it was the case for the level of GDP per capita, the behavior of the growth rate was 
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not uniform across all the countries in the group. For example, between 1981 and 1985, the 
growth rate for oil producers was negative whereas that of the non-oil producers was slightly 
positive (given the superior weight of the oil-producers in overall Arab GDP, the aggregate 
growth rate for the region ended up being negative). Not surprisingly the growth performance 
of the oil economies is vastly superior during the second half of the 1970s (when oil prices 
were high) and vastly inferior during the first half of the 1980s (when oil prices declined). In 
fact, the growth rate for the oil economies during this period was consistently lower than that 
of the non-oil countries, although neither of them was very high. Despite these differences, he 
medium-term behavior of growth rate is similar for oil and non-oil economies: the 
extraordinary growth rates of the 1960s disappeared after the first oil shock. 
The yearly correlations between each country’s growth rate and the aggregate growth 
rate for the region are very low for some of the countries, which indicates that the short-term 
business cycle for different Arab countries is not highly synchronized. However, when we 
break-down the period into five medium-term subperiods we see that similar patterns arise.  
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Figure 4 shows the growth rates for the same five superiods defined above for a 
sample of 10 Arab countries (plus the aggregate Arab world numbers displayed in Figure 3). 
The growth rates are certainly not the same for every country, but the overall pattern is very 
similar: large growth rates for the two initial periods, a substantial reduction in the early 
1980s (Oman was an exception that was more than offset by the large negative growth rate of 
Saudi Arabia), and very small growth rates across the board for the second half of the 1980s 
and 1990s. The overall trend for the growth rates is clearly negative.  
In sum, despite that the Arab world displays substantial heterogeneity in its economic 
growth performance, there is a common behavior that needs to be analyzed: the large growth 
rates of the 1960s and 1970s disappeared after 1980. For some countries, the growth rate 
became negative on average, for some countries it declined but remained positive. Overall, 
however, we can say that the growth performance of the Arab world after 1980 was 
disappointing across the board. 
  
Growth and the Distribution of Income and Poverty  
The slowdown of the growth process has very important implications for human 
welfare. For example, positive growth tends to increase the income of most social groups and 
“shift” the distribution of income to the right. Figure 5 estimates the distribution of income 
for the Arab region for selected years between 1970 and 1998 using the methodology 
developed by Sala-i-Martin (2002). We note that the distribution improved substantially 
during the 1970s. Growth led to improvements in the level of income for the majority of the 
population, rich and poor. We see that the “area under the distribution” and to the left of the 
one-dollar-a-day line, that is, the “poverty rate” decreased substantially during this period. As 
the region’s growth rate slowed down, so did the improvement in the income distribution (we 
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see in Figure 5 that, between 1980 and 1998, the distribution does not move much to the 
right). Of course this means that poverty rates did not decline much over the period of slow 
growth.  
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Over the last two decades, the world has witnessed spectacular reductions of poverty 
rates, thanks to the extraordinary growth performances of some of the largest economies of 
the planet: China, India and Indonesia.3  Figure 6 displays the poverty rates for the Arab 
world. We see that during  the “high growth rate years” of the 1970s, the Arab region 
witnessed a substantial reduction in poverty rates. The fraction of the population living with 
less than a dollar a day4 went from 11% in 1970 to 2.4% in 1980. The fraction living with less 
                                                           
3  See Sala-I-Martin (2002). 
4  The original definition of absolute is due to Ravallion et. al (1991). These researchers used 
“perceptions of poverty” in the poorest countries to place the poverty line at $31 per month. 
Later , the definition was changed to $30.42, and it then was rounded off to $1 per day. The 
$1/day line was later adopted by the World Bank as the “official” definition of“absolute 
poverty”. Another poverty line appeared in the literature that doubled the original figure to 
two dollars per day. We use both definitions in this paper. 
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than two dollars a day decreased from 30% in 1970 to 14% in 1980. The rapid reduction in 
poverty rates slowed down dramatically after 1980, when the aggregate growth rates also 
slowed down. By 1998, $1/day poverty rates was still 1% (not  much of change since 1980) 
and the $2/day rate was still above 5%.  
The Arab world has poverty levels that are substantially lower than those of countries 
with similar levels of income. There are various reasons for that. One is that the public system 
in the Arab world has constructed relatively effective safety nets as they try to maintain social 
cohesion and an egalitarian society. Another reason is that Arab countries are marked by an 
important cohesive system of private social responsibility under which families provide help 
to their members during hard times and income is redistributed through a religious charitable 
system. The dual Islamic practices of zakat and sadaqa encourage the rich members of 
society to donate a percentage of their income and wealth to the poor. Zakat fixes the 
donations to 2.5% of annual earnings. Zadaqa allows some larger flexibility to the donor, but 
it can amount to substantial sums. Overall, the sums of money collected by charitable 
organizations to redistribute income and to deal with poverty can be estimated to amount to 
large sums of money. All of this explains why poverty rates in the Arab world are small 
relative to its income levels. However, Figures 5 and 6 make it clear that the best way to 
reduce poverty over time is to increase the growth rate of the economy: poverty declined 
substantially over the period of high growth and progress slowed down significantly during 
the period of low growth. From a welfare point of view, therefore, one of the key economic 
questions is: why has the Arab world not grown much after 1980? 
 8

































The first answer economists tend to give when exploring the economic success or 
failure of a country or an economic region is that the key determinant of economic growth is 
the investment rate: countries that grow fast are countries that invest a substantial fraction of 
their GDP and countries that fail to grow are countries that fail to invest. This explanation is 
partly based on economic theory. After all, the basic old neoclassical growth model of Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956) predicts that one of the key determinants of the growth is the 
investment rate. Figure 7, however, shows that investment rates in the Arab world are not 
particularly low. The average investment rate over the period 1974-2000 is 24.6%, a rate 
larger than that of the OECD economies (22.9%) and only slightly smaller than that of the 
successful economies, some observers call them miraculous economies, of East Asia (29.9%).  
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 Over time, we see that the investment rate in the Arab world increased substantially 
from 17% in the pre-oil shock period to 27% in the post-oil shock period. The interesting  
thing is that this rather large shift in the investment rate applies to both oil-producers and 
non-oil-producers. The puzzling fact is that the investment rate increased again to 28% during 
 the 1981-1985 period. We say this is puzzling because the growth rate became negative 
during this period. If the investment rate is a key determinant of the growth rate of an 
economy, why did the growth rate decline in the 1980s, a time in which the investment rates 
increased and remained high?  
The investment rates declined a little bit during the late 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Some analysts (UNDP (2002), Bisat et al. (1997)) suggest that this reduction in the 
investment rate is responsible for the slow growth of the Arab region after 1980. We think 
that this is not the case for two reasons. First, we note that the reduction in the investment rate 
occurs five years after the overall growth rate falls dramatically (and even becomes negative). 
In particular, notice that the investment  rate reaches its highest level (27% of GDP) in the 
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period 1981-1985, which is precisely the five-year period in which the growth rate was at is 
lowest level (-2.1%). One would think that the large investment rates during the early 1980s 
were a response, a consequence to the large growth rates of the 1970s (the Arab countries 
were trying to invest the proceeds of the good old 70s) rather than the cause of slow growth 
during that period. Similarly, the reduction in investment rates that followed the horrible first 
half of the 1980s was a consequence, not a cause, of the terrible growth performance of the 
first half of the decade.  
The second reason is that, despite its small reduction, investment rates remained high 
for international standards. Granted that the investment rate was not as high as in the 
miraculous countries of East Asia, but it was certainly comparable to those of the industrial 
countries of the OECD and far larger than those of the average developing country (see 
Figure 7).  Moreover, investment rates in the Arab world during the late 80s and through the 
90s remained higher than they had been in the 1960s, a period in which the region enjoyed 
much larger growth rates. And if the investment rates were higher in the 90s than in the 60s, 
why was the growth rate so much lower? Where was all this investment going during the 80s 
and 90s? Why didn’t the large investment effort that was made after 1973 pay off in the form 
of larger growth rates? 
We should point out that the behavior of the Arab countries is not particularly 
puzzling because empirical growth economists have found that the investment rate is not 
robustly correlated with growth in a large cross-section of countries. For example, 
Doppelhoffer et al. (2002) use a new methodology based on Bayesian Model Averaging to 
test the variables that are robustly correlated with growth and find, perhaps surprisingly, that 
the investment rate is not one of the successfully robust variables. Similarly, Easterly, 
Kremer, Prittchet and Summers, (1993) and Easterly and Levine (2001) show that, while the 
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investment rate does not change much over time for the majority of countries in the world, the 
growth rate is highly volatile. If investment rates do not move much across decades but 
growth rates do, it is not possible for investment to be an important determinant of growth. In 
fact, this empirical result is partially confirmed by our data for the Arab world: whereas the 
growth rate falls dramatically after 1973, the investment rate remains relatively constant over 
the following 27 years. Thus, an initial answer of the question “where has Arab investment 
gone?” is that we don’t know, but this is not especially puzzling because it happens all over 
the world. 
A deeper answer can also be found in the empirical cross-country growth literature: 
what matters for growth is not the overall level of investment but its quality and efficiency. 
For example, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2002) find that one of the robust determinants of the rate of 
economic growth is public investment. Perhaps the surprising fact is that the sign of the 
partial correlation is… negative!!! In other words, holding constant aggregate investment and 
various other determinants of growth, the larger the fraction of investment that comes from 
the public sector, the smaller the growth rate of the country. Although this result might seem 
puzzling, there are, in fact, some economic explanations for it: Public investment, like all 
public expenditures, needs to be financed with distortionary taxes, and these tend to hurt 
economic growth. If public investment is productive, its overall effect on aggregate growth 
will depend on whether the positive effects on national productivity are larger than the 
negative effects that arise from the distortionary taxes that need to be raised to finance it. 
This, of course, is true if public investment is productive. In reality, however, it is not 
uncommon to see that public investment decisions are made inefficiently or in the wrong 
sectors. The precise project financed by the public sector could be very productive if chosen 
efficiently…but it could be quite useless, for example, if the government makes investment 
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decisions with the objective of obtaining political or private gains. Notice that unproductive 
public investment still needs to be financed with distortionary taxes. Thus, when public 
investment projects in a country are predominantly unproductive, then the their overall effect 
is to reduce the growth rate.  
This discussion is particularly relevant for the Arab world because if we analyze the 
ratio of private investment to public investment we see that it is unusually low. As seen in 
Figure 8, for the Arab world as a whole, the ratio is close to 2, that is, private investment is 
twice as large as public investment. The private/public ratio is slightly larger for non-oil 
economies than oil economies in the region, but the overall ratio remains well below the 
levels of OECD economies (with ratios close to 6) or of the rapidly growing East Asian 
economies (with ratios close to 5).5  
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The reforms of the 1990s have moved the Arab economies in the right direction, in the 
                                                           
5  Again, there is substantial heterogeneity within the Arab world: the ratio for Morocco is 
seven whereas that for Tunisia is four. Both countries’ ratios are close to those of the OECD 
and East Asia. 
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sense that the ratio of private to public investment has increased. For the region as a whole, 
the ratio increased from 1.6 in the 1980s to 2.4 in the 1990s. The non-oil countries were the 
ones that went further in reforming: the ratio increased from 1.8 to 3.0 whereas the non-oil 
economies increased from 1.4 to 1.7.  As a way of comparison, it is interesting to see that the 
ratios of OECD economies also increased from 5.7 in the 80s to 6.6 in the 1990s. Similarly, 
the ratios for East Asia increased from 4.8 to 5.1 over the same period. Hence, although 
reforms in the Arab world have gone in the right direction, they were not nearly large enough 
to put the private-to-public investment ratios at the levels of OECD or East Asian Economies. 
Despite the large investments of the public sector in the Arab world, infrastructures 
remain alarmingly inefficient. For example, according to the World Bank, the percentage of 
unsuccessful telephone calls is 35% in Tunisia, 46% in Yemen, 50% in Lebanon, 57% in 
Morocco and 60% in Jordan. Whereas the process of transmission and distribution of 
electricity suffers losses equivalent to 5% of output in OECD and East Asian countries, losses 
in the Arab world amount to 13%. Hardly the numbers on would expect from economically 
competitive countries.6  
 
Inefficient Transmission of Savings to Investment  
Private investment in the Arab world is both insufficient and inefficient. One of the 
reasons for the insufficiency is that the financial sector does not channel savings properly to 
productive investment projects. Some of the blame goes to the government and its 
exceptionally large participation in the financial sector. As is common in most of the 
developing world, the financial sector in Arab countries plays a smaller role than in rich 
industrial economies and, perhaps more importantly, it is almost completely dominated by the 
                                                           
6  World Bank (1995). 
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banking system. Capital markets are either underdeveloped or non-existent. Most have low 
levels of trading and very few listed companies. Figure 9 shows three measures of the 
importance of capital markets: the market capitalization as a percentage of aggregate GDP, 
the value of stocks traded as percentage of GDP and the turnover ratio. We notice that the 
three measures show substantial underdevelopment of the Arab world relative to both the 
industrialized economies of the OECD and the high-growth economies of East Asia. For 
example, according to the Capital Intelligence Unit (2001), the stock market value of traded 
companies as a fraction of GDP is 10 times higher in the OECD than in the Arab world and 
13 times higher in East Asia. The turnover ratio is 4 and 5 times larger respectively. As an 
example, at year-end 1999, the Tunis Stock Exchange comprised only 44 companies, of 
which 13 were banks. Yemen has no stock market. There are two official stock exchanges in 
the UAE, the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and the Abu Dabi Securities Market (ADSM). 
The problem is that the DFM was set up in March 2000 and ADSM in November 2001. The 
lack of liquid investments has a direct negative effect on productive investment as it makes it 
difficult for entrepreneurs to raise capital to finance their potentially good ideas.7 The fact 
that many of the large companies tend to be either public or in the hands of politically 
influential individuals has led to low repayment rates and this has contributed to impede the 
development of efficient bond and capital markets. The low levels of development of capital 
markets as well as of primary and secondary bond markets forces potential real investors into 
the hands of the banking system which, as a result, has become immensely powerful (both 
economically and politically). 
                                                           
7  See Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Ross Levine  for an empirical and theoretical documentation 
of the negative impact that an underdeveloped financial system may have on growth. 
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Despite their domination of the financial sector, banks are not sufficiently efficient so 
as to play the critical role they must play in the process of economic growth and development: 
lending remains predominantly short-term and trade-related, with very little being directed to 
long-term productive investments. The lack of competition among banks leads to lack of 
innovation in lending. Despite recent efforts to liberalize and privatize the banking system, 
governments have protected the banks from competition by restricting entry at the local and 
international levels, and this has made them inefficient. In several countries, the state remains 
the dominant player in the banking system, owning a major proportion of the banks’ capital. 
An important fraction of the state-owned banks’ business is the financing of housing at 
subsidized interest rates, which usually impose significant financial costs to the banks and, 
therefore, to the state. In some of the countries where the banks are privately owned, public 
policy tends to select “privileged sectors” that tend to enjoy credit at subsidized interest rates 
as well as recurrent debt forgiveness. While many countries have freed interests on deposits 
and lending, the legal failure to enforce collateral rights discourages financial intermediaries 
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from lending to small businesses or clients that do not have long borrowing records … or 
political connections.   
In sum, although the banking system is the most important part of the financial sector, 
its extraordinarily inefficiency does not lead it to allocate national savings to their most 
productive uses. Without this proper channeling of savings into productive and efficient 
investment, economic growth is impossible. Thus, continuing the reform of the banking 
sector is a necessary process for the Arab world. These reform must include (a) further 
elimination of abusive and inefficient regulation, (b) opening the financial markets to 
domestic and foreign entrants in order to promote competition, financial innovation and 
modernization, (c) strengthening (public or private) supervision to achieve sound corporate 
governance and accountability, (d) privatization of the remaining state banks, ensuring that 
the right incentives for sound commercial policies are in place (shifting their commercial 
operations away from housing-financing at subsidized interest rates to productive long-term 
investment) and (e) incorporation of the available new technologies that are already changing 
the nature of the financial sector worldwide. 
 
Inefficient Investment 
Another source of low growth in the Arab world is its reduced overall economic 
efficiency. One measure of the overall evolution of the efficiency of the economy is the Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) growth index. TFP growth measures the growth in the economy 
that cannot be accounted by the measured increases in capital and labor. In other words, the 
part of the overall economic growth that cannot be accounted for by increases in physical 
capital and labor must be accounted by the change in the overall efficiency of capital and 
labor. Figure 10 shows the evolution of TFP growth for a sample of Arab countries between 
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1975 and 2000.8 The numbers are staggeringly low: with the exception of Egypt, Oman, 
Syria and Tunisia, productivity growth in the Arab world has been negative. That is, the 
efficiency of the economy has deteriorated markedly. 
 






















































Why is the productivity of investment in the Arab world so low? And why has it 
declined over time? Again, there is no unique explanation. We will highlight three: political 
and social instability, a deteriorated business environment due to excessive public 
intervention and overregulation, and low quality of human capital.  
 
Political Instability  
War, violence, and social conflicts are and have been widespread throughout the Arab 
World during the period we are considering here. For example, Libya has had constant 
conflicts with Chad over the Aozou strip and has suffered the U.N. sanctions for supporting 
                                                           
8  The productivity estimates are our own, but they are similar to those estimated by other researchers and 
analysts (UNDP (2002) and Bisat et al. (1997)) 
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terrorism. This is not the optimal political and social environment for productive investment 
to flourish. 
In Algeria, the first round success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) party in 
December 1991 caused the army to nullify the results and to crack down on the FIS. The FIS 
reaction resulted in a continuous civil conflict with the state apparatus, with mass 
assassinations and widespread political violence. FIS's armed arm, the Islamic Salvation 
Army, disbanded itself in January 2000 and many armed militants surrendered under an 
amnesty program designed to promote national reconciliation. Nevertheless, residual fighting 
continues.  
Lebanon suffered a devastating 16-year civil war, which ended in 1991. Since then, 
the country has made progress toward rebuilding its political institutions and regaining its 
national sovereignty. The Lebanese have conducted several successful elections, most of the 
militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have 
extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. However, 
Hizballah (the radical Shi'a party) retains its weapons. Syria maintains about 25,000 troops in 
Lebanon based mainly in Beirut, North Lebanon, and the Bekaa Valley. Syria's troop 
deployment was legitimized by the Arab League during Lebanon's civil war and in the Ta'if 
Accord that ended it. Israel's withdrawal from its security zone in southern Lebanon in May 
of 2000, however, has emboldened some Lebanese Christians and Druze to demand that Syria 
withdraw its forces as well. 
Territorial disputes between Iraq and Iran led to a very costly eight-year war between 
1980 and 1988. In August 1990 Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by US-led, United 
Nations coalition forces during January-February 1991. Following Kuwait's liberation, the 
UN Security Council required Iraq to destroy all weapons of mass destruction and long-range 
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missiles and to allow UN verification inspections. Sanctions remain in effect due to alleged 
incomplete Iraqi compliance with relevant Security Council’s resolutions. 
The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements 
(the DOP), signed in Washington on 13 September 1993, provided for a transitional period 
not exceeding five years of Palestinian interim self-government in the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank. Israel agreed to transfer certain powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian 
Authority, which includes the Palestinian Legislative Council elected in January 1996, as part 
of interim self-governing arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A transfer of 
powers and responsibilities for the Gaza Strip and Jericho took place after the May 1994 
Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Additional areas of the West Bank 
followed suit. An intifadah broke out in September 2000; the resulting widespread violence in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel's military response, and instability in the Palestinian 
Authority are undermining progress toward a permanent settlement and contribute to the 
deterioration of the business environment that would be necessary to regain the path towards 
steady economic growth. 
The British withdrew from South Yemen (a protectorate they had created in the 19th 
century around the southern port of Aden) on November 30, 1967. Three years later, the 
southern government adopted a Marxist orientation. The massive exodus of hundreds of 
thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north (which had become independent from the 
Ottoman empire in 1918) contributed to two decades of hostility between the two states. The 
two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in May 22, 1990. A southern 
military bid to break away from the Union was defeated by the north in 1994. 
These are just some examples of political, military, and social conflict that have 
plagued the Arab world during the last several decades. This kind of instability has direct 
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implications on the level of income through destruction of productive capacity, but it also has 
longer term consequences as it does not contribute to create the business environment that is 
necessary for any economy to prosper. These conflicts have certainly contributed to deter 




The weak business environment of the Arab region acts as another important 
constraint to the process of economic growth. Of course, the social and military conflicts that 
we described in the previous section contribute to the continued deterioration of the business 
environment. But violence is not the only problem. Potential investors in many Arab 
countries face a suffocating web of complex regulations, licensing, and other institutional 
distortions which are often unclear and usually inconsistent with the rules that apply in the 
rest of the world. Most private investors are scared away by such cumbersome process, and 
this leads to less entry and competition. This lack of competition, in turn, leads to a more 
inefficient and innovative economic system.  
Those investors who are not deterred by such opaque system, play in it at a very high 
cost. Egyptian entrepreneurs spend close to 35% of their time solving problems related to 
government regulation. Even Morocco (a country that has liberalized its economy more than 
its Arab neighbors) requires more than 20 documents and over six months to register a new 
business. The easy way around the complicated bureaucratic process is often bribery, local 
corruption, and unhealthy incest-like relations between family-owned businesses and the 
political power. Needless to say that this further deteriorates competition and the business 
environment.  
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Privatization and separation of business and politics needs to be a priority in the Arab 
world. Countries with large and inefficient public sectors (such as Algeria and Egypt) will 
have to, first, sell off state-owned money-losing enterprises and, second, attract private 
investment by deregulating and lowering political and institutional barriers of all kinds. The 
evidence shows that there is no shortage of funding for privatization in the region. But a 
bottleneck is, again, the inefficient banking system and the small or inexistent debt markets 
and stock exchanges. Countries with less burdensome public enterprise systems (such as 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and some Gulf countries) will have to concentrate on the 
second strategy of reduction of excessive regulation, licensing requirements and bureaucratic 
barriers that impede the normal process of business investment. Finally, an equitable, well-
functioning legal system (including an effective judiciary) that supervises the economic 
process and guarantees transparency and justice is also critical in promoting economic 
investment and growth. 
 
Human Capital  
Another important explanation for the lack of incentives for private businesses to 
invest in the Arab world is the low quality of human capital. The economic growth literature 
has been emphasizing the importance of human capital in the process of economic growth 
and development. Moreover, it as emphasized the complementarity between human and 
physical capital investment: if potential investors cannot hire a highly qualified and trained 
labor force, their investments will not deliver profits. It follows that investment in physical 
capital will not take place in economies with low-quality human capital.  
Despite some improvements over the last two decades, enrollment rates in the Arab 
world remains well below that of the industrial countries: primary school enrollment remains 
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below 85% (100% in the OECD),9 secondary school enrollment remains below just above 
50% (again close to 100% in the OECD), and tertiary school enrollment remains below 15% 
(over 60% in the OECD). 
But perhaps the most important problem with human capital accumulation in the Arab 
world is not only the fact that enrollment rates remain below international standards, but the 
fact that the quality of the education system is low and unconnected to the needs of 
productive firms. An empirical confirmation of this fact is that the educated in the Arab world 
suffer from high unemployment rates and declining real wages. More importantly, the 
education system fails to teach Arab citizens to adapt to a dynamic world of rapid technical 
change. The Arab educational system does not prepare students for the present world of 
global knowledge and the information technologies.  
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According to ITU (2001), the penetration of both computers and internet access in the 
Arab world is small relative to that of East Asia and the OECD (see Figure 11). One possible 
                                                           
9  In fact, primary school enrollment ratios in the Arab world are lower than those of the 
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reason, of course, is that prices are higher in the Arab world. For example, the ITU reports 
that off-peak internet access costs close to $35 per month in the Arab world whereas the 
average cost is less than $23 in the OECD and about $13 in East Asia. The cost in the United 
States is less than $7 whereas in Yemen, internet access costs $45, more than 6 times more. 
Another possibility is, of course, that the people in the Arab world as not as well trained to 
use new technologies as those of the industrial nations.  
The educational system should be reformed to not teach students to “learn things” but 
to “learn how to learn”. Only if the future workers learn to adapt in a changing technological 
and business environment, firms will feel confident in the human capital of a nation. The 
reforms must be done by bringing together the education sector, the government and the 
private business sector. Close coordination between firms and schools and universities is 
needed if education has to provide useful and productive services to the workers of the future. 
The introduction of new technologies provides a unique chance for the Arab world to 
catch up as it allows to bypass the old problems that have strangled the traditional sectors. In 
order to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the information technologies, these 
need to be introduced without the monopolistic and highly distorted structures that 
characterize the other sectors. Interest groups may make it harder to reform old sectors than to 




The Arab world has suffered a 20-year-long growth slowdown. The decline in the 
investment rate in the region is probably a consequence, not a cause, of this slowdown. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
developing world as a whole. 
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Investment has remained high for international and historical standards, but this has not 
translated into larger growth rates. The reason is that what matters for growth is not the 
quantity of investment but its quality. We argue that there two broad explanations for this 
“missing growth puzzle”. First, too large a fraction of this overall investment has been 
unproductive public investment. And second, private investment has met a hostile 
environment in at least three dimensions: (1) excessive political, social, and military conflicts 
throughout the region, (2) excessive government intervention, protection and regulation 
suffocates the business environment and makes private investment uncompetitively 
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